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Introduction 
‘Vulnerability’ best sums up the plight of small states in any 
discourse on security. Many size factors interplay to entangle 
most small states in a network of insecurities, and smallness 
has seldom been beautiful. Small states have often been the 
‘objects of conquest’ in the big powers’ scramble for dominion 
during the colonial and cold war periods. They have been 
conquered, cornered, exploited and reduced to mere buffer 
states or pawns in war-games, sometimes changing many 
hands, since their military – the traditional guarantor of 
security – was weak.  
 
A normative shift in the concept of security today brought 
about by uni-polar world and the process of globalization 
does no good either, despite existing international law and 
post-Kuwait, -cold war norms. The new security threat is 
more subtle, dangerous and difficult to contain. While the old 
military threat still looms large, new forces working across 
borders are beyond their control, and this complicates the 
security situation further. How will small states fare under 
this new world order? There are both opportunities and 
challenges arising from both the realist and idealist world 
orders and the process of globalization.  
 
Bhutan is a small Buddhist kingdom with an area of 40,076 
square kilometers landlocked between India and China. These 
two Asian giants have asymmetric geography, demography, 
economy, military, natural resource endowments and 
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civilizations vis-à-vis Bhutan.1 But these two regional powers 
have been competitors, not partners in the regions, thus 
creating a difficult atmosphere for its small neighbours. Like 
Nepal, Bhutan is like ‘a yam between two boulders’2 and this 
geo-strategic location makes Bhutan so important in big 
neighbours’ perception of security.  
 
Bhutan has never been colonized and as a result Bhutanese 
society has traditionally been sensitive to the issues of 
security, and preserving its sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity has historically been a constant 
challenge.3 The two great world wars and cold war have 
spared Bhutan unlike its neighbours. However, it was the 
focus of big powers politics – Tibetans and Mongols from 
north, and the British India from the south. Today they are 
replaced by China and India. Bhutan fought seven wars in 
the north and three in the south to protect its territorial 
sovereignty.  
 
Its long history and tradition of political independence, UN 
membership, political leaderships and successful bilateral 
and multilateral politics have indeed played a big part in 
avoiding the fates of its neighbours – integration of Tibet with 
China (1959) and Sikkim to India (1976). Bhutan closed its 
old historical ties with Tibet (China) due to various political 
and historical reasons. The geography, moreover, favoured 
India, for Himalaya barred an easy access to the north. 
Today, Bhutan’s relation with China remains frozen like 
Himalayan ice itself, while Bhutan-India relation burns like 
heat of Indian tropics. But the global shift in the regional and 
                                              
1 Bhutan lost about 3000 square kilometers of its land to the British 
India during the Duar War, 1864-65, and a few hundred square 
kilometers to China in process of settling border disputes. 
2 Prithvi Narayan Shah in 1778, then the Raja of Gorkha, used this 
metaphor to compare Nepal’s plight between India and China. 
3 Tashi Choden and Dorji Penjore (2004). Economic and Political 
Between Bhutan and Neighbouring Countries, Thimphu: The Centre 
for Bhutan Studies 
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international relations mostly brought about by forces of 
globalization is changing this status quo.  
 
This paper discusses three broad crosscutting security issues 
facing Bhutan today – a) Sino-Bhutan border conflict, its 
security implications, and how resolution of border problem 
will further complicate its security; b) possible changes in the 
Indo-Bhutan relation due to other forces such as India’s 
north-east insurgents, improving Sino-Bhutan relation and 
its implication on India’s security concern; and c) the dark 
side of globalization – the impacts of Bhutan joining World 
Trade Organization (WTO), and the introduction of satellite TV 
and information technology which are changing the very 
fabrics on which Bhutan’s national identity is writ large.  
 
Besides other problems, the above three issues are going to 
have major impacts on the security of Bhutan in the next few 
decades. 
Bringing History into Perspective 
An understanding of Bhutan’s political history is a 
prerequisite for getting full pictures of the above issues.  
 
Bhutan has a long history of Buddhist civilization beginning 
Eighth century AD. However, it was unified as a nation 
between 1616 and 1652. Historically, Bhutan - the land of 
peaceful dragon - has never been at peace; Bhutan was a 
victor4 as much as it has been a vanquished.5 Throughout its 
history, its big neighbours and imperialists had posed great 
security threats - Tibet in the 17th and 18th centuries, followed 
by the British India in the 19th century.6 However, it was 
never colonized, thus making the issue of security, 
                                              
4 Bhutan invaded the kingdoms of Cooch Behar and Sikkim  
5 Lost all three wars fought with the British, and ceded one-third of 
its southern territories.  
6 Karma Ura, “Perception of Security,” in South Asian Security: 
Future, Dipankar Banerjee (eds.) (Colombo: Regional Centre for 
Strategic Studies) 
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sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity very 
sensitive today.  
 
Tibet seriously challenged Bhutan’s statehood because it 
supposedly stood in its way of consolidating the entire 
Himalayan Buddhist regions into a Gelugpa domain. The 
process of founding of Bhutan and Tibet as nations, Bhutan 
under First Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyal (1594-1651?) and 
Tibet under V Dalia Lama Ngawang Losang Gyatso (1617-
1682), were almost parallel events.7 Tibetans and combined 
Tibetan-Mongol forces unsuccessfully invaded Bhutan seven 
times in the 17th century.8 But the event of 1730 was to 
haunt the country. During the internal strife of 1729-1735 in 
western Bhutan, Paro Penlop declared independence and 
invited the Tibetan forces for assistance. Joint military forces 
of Paro Penlop and Tibetan defeated the Bhutanese 
government troops for the first time. The Tibetan ruler 
Pholanas informed the Chinese emperor that he had brought 
Bhutan under the emperor’s rule, and the Chinese vague 
suzerainty claim over Bhutan was based on this little piece of 
misinformation.9  
 
Historically, Bhutan had a cordial relation with the British 
India before it expanded its border to the north. The whole 
stretch of plains measuring 3000 square miles along the 
present India’s borders called Duars was under Bhutanese 
sovereignty.10 Bhutan became a rightful kingmaker in Cooch 
Behar kingdom, and even stationed a small force. Relation 
became rocky after the interests of the British and Bhutan 
                                              
7 V Dalai Lama consolidated Gelpgpa School by persecuting other 
schools, Drukpa Kagyu being one. 
8 In 1618, 1634, 1639, 1644-46, 1649, 1656-57, 1675-79) 
9 Karma Ura, pp 136. Chinese claim was based on the work of 
Chinese historian Tieh-tsung where he wrote that China assumed 
suzerainty over Bhutan beginning 1831. 
10 There were a total of 18 Duars under Bhutanese rule - 7 Assam 
Duars in Darrang and Kamrup, and 11 Bengal Duars from river 
Testa to Manas, including districts of Ambari Falakata and Jalpesh. 
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clashed in Cooch Behar, resulting into the first Anglo-Bhutan 
War in 1772. This was the beginning of the British interests 
in Bhutan as a gateway to British trade with Tibet. Many 
missions were consequently sent to extend and ‘explore 
frontiers of knowledge’ and open trade route to Central Asia.  
 
Duar War and the Treaty of Sinchula, 1965 
The British annexation of Assam in 1829 brought Bhutan 
into a direct contact with the British, leading to hostility 
(1837-64) with the East India Company and later with the 
British Empire. Over the next century, the British interests in 
Bhutan changed from trade to security following the Great 
Game between Russia, China and the British powers over the 
control of Central Asia. Bhutan too was then a political power 
to be reckoned with. While mighty Himalaya barred Bhutan’s 
northern expansion, its southern regions provided incentives, 
thus leading to interference in affairs of Cooch Behar and 
Sikkim, and the final invasions. 
 
The Duars was a single most important part of Bhutanese 
territory, fiscally and economically.11 The British annexation 
of Assam Duars in 1841 resulted to the Duar War of 1864-65. 
Its direct result was a humiliating Treaty of Sinchula, 1865 
which annexed all Bengal Duars and extended borders to 
foothills, in return for a monetary compensation. The British 
took over Bhutan’s role in Sikkim and Cooch Behar12 in 
return for non-interference in its internal matters.13 This 
treaty institutionalized the relation between the two countries 
                                              
11 Karma Ura, ibid 
12 Bhutan exercised its force in Sikkim, Cooch Behar kingdom and 
principality of Vijapur, and this factor brought Bhutan in direct 
contact with the British interests. 
13 The Article 2 “agreed that the whole of the tract known as the 
Eighteen Doars … is ceded by the Bhootan Government to the 
British Government forever,” and Article 4 provides that “In 
consideration of the cession by the Bhootan Government of the 
territories specified in Article 2 of this Treaty…the British 
Government agreed to make an annual allowance to the Government 
of Bhootan of a sum not exceeding fifty-thousand rupees...” 
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for the first time, and provided basis for future relation. The 
terms of the treaty curtailed Bhutan’s expansion in the south 
and west – the areas British contested.  
 
Manchu Claim and the Treaty of Punakha, 1910 
45 years later the Treaty of Punakha, 1910 was signed in 
response to geopolitical changes in the north. There was a 
strong China’s presence in Tibet and the British became 
concerned with the China’s forward policy in Tibet and other 
Himalayan states. China had also claimed all Himalayan 
states as its suzerains and the British wanted to stop the 
Chinese expansion by keeping Tibet, Bhutan, Nepal and 
Sikkim as buffer states. 
 
The new treaty’s provisions increased annual compensation 
for the forced occupation of Bhutanese territory, and 
guaranteed non-interference in Bhutan’s internal affairs in 
return for the British guidance on its external matters. 
Bhutan was an independent country, and thus it only became 
a kind of loose British dependency for practical and political 
purpose. It was a balanced treaty despite enhancing the 
British role from arbitrator to an advisor on external 
matters.14  
 
However, China suzerainty claim on Bhutan intensified in 
1949 when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was born, 
and an acrimonious relation with the new China began.  
Sino-Bhutan Relation 
Bhutan is the only China’s neighbour with whom it does not 
have a diplomatic relation despite sharing a common border. 
Incursion by People Liberation Army (PLA) into undefined 
border areas has been a threat to its territorial integrity and 
national security during the last few decades. Bhutan is 
under increasing pressure to start a diplomatic relation with 
China, and diplomatic relation was made an indirect 
                                              
14 Tashi and Dorji, ibid 
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precondition for a resolving border dispute. What implications 
will this bilateral relation have on Bhutan-India relation and 
the two countries’ national security? Historically, Bhutan was 
closer to Tibet than India, but geo-political and historical 
factors have frozen the relation in 1960. China’s claim on 
Bhutan tilted the balance completely. 
 
What interest did old China have in Bhutan? As most 
historians point out, it was no more than bringing Bhutan 
under its area of influence and stopping the British 
expansion. One big but vague tool China used, as elsewhere, 
was its concept of ‘middle kingdom’ suzerainty. But it 
backfired, especially in Bhutan’s case. There is no historical 
record of two countries having any contact until the Ching 
dynasty maintained its residents in Lhasa around 1720s.15 
China made concerted efforts to exercise ‘historic’ rights over 
Bhutan between 1865 when the Treaty of Sinchula was 
signed and the signing of the Treaty of Punakha in 1910. The 
new Republic of China slowly let the claim die down, only to 
surface later. 
 
China watched Bhutan become an Indian area of influence 
after signing the Indo-Bhutan Friendship Treaty of 1949. As 
far as 1930, Chairman Mao "declared that the correct 
boundaries of China would include Burma, Bhutan, 
Nepal…”16 But later editions deleted the claim after PRC 
began to form a 'Himalayan federation" comprising of Tibet, 
Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and the North-East Frontier 
Agency (NEFA) of India to extend its influence in southern 
Himalayas. Later PRC used its suzerainty tool much 
aggressively. In 1954 PRC published A Brief History of China 
where a considerable portion of Bhutan was included as a 
                                              
15 Chinese claim was based on the work of Chinese historian Tieh-
tsung where he wrote that China assumed suzerainty over Bhutan 
beginning 1731, after the Tibet's ruler Polhanas misinformed the 
Tibet's overlord of Ching dynasty that Bhutan was under him.  
16 In the original version of The Chinese Revolution and the 
Communist Party openly 
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pre-historical realm of China.17 In 1958, another map claimed 
a large tract of Bhutanese lands, and later occupied about 
300 square miles of Bhutanese territory in the north and 
north-eastern Bhutan. The Chinese claim surfaced again in 
1960 when it openly declared that Bhutanese, Sikkimese and 
Ladakhis form a united family in Tibet, that they have always 
been subject to Tibet and to the great motherland of China, 
and that they must once again be united and taught the 
communist doctrine. 
Bhutan’s Southward Policy  
For centuries Tibet has been a spiritual heartland of 
Mahayana Buddhist in Himalayan regions, and the loss of its 
neighbour had a great security implication for Bhutan. 
Tensions following Tibet’s integration subsided after the Sino-
Tibetan Treaty of 1951 promised Tibet’s autonomy, and the 
1952 Agreement with India allowed New Delhi to maintain a 
consul-general in Lhasa. The five principles of peaceful co-
existence (panchshila) of 1954 demonstrated a benign 
Chinese attitude to its neighbours. Bhutan’s mission in Lhasa 
functioned as before, and the trade continued. But the 
relation worsened after the brutal crushing of anti-Chinese 
revolts, first in eastern Tibet (1954-1955) and later in central 
Tibet (1958). The Tibetan uprising in 1959, the Dalai Lama’s 
flight to India, and reports of Chinese troops along the ill-
defined frontier posed a security threat. 
 
After Tibet's integration, China resorted to carrots and sticks 
policy – carrots in form of economic assistance and assurance 
of independence, and sticks in the form of continuous claims. 
In 1959 the PLA occupied eight Bhutanese enclaves in 
                                              
17 The other countries included were Soviet Asian Republics of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Nepal, Sikkim, Assam, 
Burma, Malaya, Thailand, North and South Vietnam, Laos, 
Cambodia, Sulu Island of Indonesia, Taiwan, Korea and a large part 
of the Soviet Far east 
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western Tibet,18 and that same year, Chinese Premier Chou 
En-Lai expressed China's desire for a direct bilateral border 
talk with Bhutan. Bhutan was forced to close its northern 
border and withdrew its representatives in Lhasa and officers 
in western Tibet in 1960, thus putting an end to a thousand 
year old relations with Tibet. With its traditional northern 
trade route closed, Bhutan turned south.  
Beginning of Border Problem 
Sino-Bhutan border dispute is not so much a contest over 
territory as it is of China’s desire to punish Bhutan for allying 
with its regional rival India. Territorial conflict is only a tip of 
an iceberg.  
 
A 470-kilometer long un-demarcated Bhutan-Tibet border did 
not trouble the peoples of both countries until the Chinese 
takeover of Tibet. China has warned that that boundary 
dispute was a source of conflicts in the world, and it would 
take just a small incident to conflagrate the situation into a 
difficult diplomatic or a military confrontation. Tibetan 
herders, even PLA, stray into what Bhutan considers as its 
territory, while Bhutanese herders too stray into what China 
considers as theirs. The herdsmen of both countries have 
been exercising their rights to traditional pasturelands, thus 
leading to claims and counterclaims in un-demarcated 
borders.  
 
The border problem posed a serious security threat after 
September 1979 incursion into Bhutanese territory. When 
Bhutan protested, China expressed its desire to solve the 
problem bilaterally. That same year, the National Assembly 
deliberated on normalizing relation with China and initiating 
                                              
18 The eight enclaves, Khangri, Tarcheng, Checkar, Jangtong, Tussu, 
Janghi, Dirafoo, Chakop and Kachan were given to Bhutan by a 
Ladakhi king Singye Namgyal in the 17th century. Bhutan exercised 
administrative jurisdiction and they were never subject to Tibetan 
law, nor did they pay any Tibetan taxes. 
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a direct talk to resolve the problem. The subsequent events 
led to a direct China-Bhutan border talk. Until then Bhutan’s 
border issues has been incorporated with the Sino-Indian 
border discussion.  
 
While the preliminary talks began in 1981, the first formal 
meeting took place in Beijing in 1984. The talks began to be 
held every year alternatively in Thimphu and Beijing since 
then. China has always maintained that Indo-Bhutan Treaty 
of 1949 is an ‘unequal’ treaty – a symbol of India’s hegemony 
in the region, and Chinese Premier in his message on the 
1984 National Day of Bhutan conveyed that China attached 
great importance to developing friendly and neighbourly 
relations with Bhutan. 
 
The progress has been slow because of the political and 
technical nature of the problem. However, a lot of differences 
were narrowed, and agreement was reached on basic guiding 
principle on boundary settlement.  
Swapping Border Resolution for Diplomatic Relation 
It became evident from the very first that China was more 
interested in developing direct relation with Bhutan than 
resolving border issues. During the second round in 1985, 
China talked of expanding contact, saying that it has 
diplomatic relations with all SAARC states, but not with 
Bhutan.  
 
In 1996, Bhutan discovered the Chinese logging and road 
construction activities in the disputed territory, and when the 
issue was brought up in the 11th round, China proposed for 
the signing of an interim agreement for maintenance of peace 
and tranquility along the borders. This agreement was signed 
on 8 December 1998 in the 12th round. This interim 
agreement is very significant because it is the first legal 
document that has been signed by the two countries, and 
until that time there was no evidence of China recognizing 
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Bhutan’s sovereignty, except that it has claimed Bhutan as a 
part of China. 
 
Chinese approach in resolving the border as in Nepal was 
through a ‘package deal’ rather than a ‘sector-by-sector’ 
settlement. During the 11th round held in Beijing, China 
proposed to exchange 495 square kilometers area19 with an 
area of 269 square kilometers in the north-west Bhutan.20 
Sinchulumba shares border with Sikkim and is very close to 
Chumbi valley, and this particular territorial swapping would 
seriously undermine India’s security by shifting the Bhutan-
China border to the south. However, both sides agreed to 
discuss at technical level, and then decide on the Chinese 
and Bhutanese territories on maps. The 18th round was held 
in Thimphu in 2004.  
Are Two Countries Heading for a Diplomatic Relation? 
Besides yearly border consultations, contacts at various levels 
have increased in recent decades, beginning the 1974 
Coronation. The sports, religious and cultural visits have 
been followed by participation in regional and international 
meetings on security, hydropower development, tourism and 
health. Bhutan has always maintained one-China policy by 
voting for restoring China's United Nations’ seat in 1971, and 
as 55th UN General Assembly’s Vice-chairman, Bhutan 
rejected Taiwan's participation motions in UN and WHO. 
Bhutan also opposed Taiwan's bid to host 2002 Asian Games. 
The Chinese ambassador to India has been visiting Bhutan 
on regular basis since 1994, and Bhutanese ambassador 
visited China in 2000. These visits have opened up new 
channels of interaction and contacts for exchanging opinions 
on different issues, besides boundary talks 
 
Unresolved northern border is a serious concern for Bhutan’s 
national security and territorial sovereignty and it has to be 
                                              
19 Pasamlung and Jarkarlung valleys in the northern borders  
20 Sinchulumba, Dramana and Shakhtoe 
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solved soon. But if diplomatic relation is a precondition for 
resolving border problem, how will it affect Indo-Bhutan 
relation.  
Indo-Bhutan Relation: A Relation Stronger than ever before  
Bhutan and India is bound together by a 'special relation’. 
This special relation has slowly evolved from a donor-recipient 
to equal partner relationship, the best example being 
development of Bhutan’s water resource for hydropower 
generation. While India is helping Bhutan harness the water 
resource through aid, grant, and loan, energy-deficient India 
could benefit from energy import from Bhutan. In 2001 about 
94.1 % of Bhutan’s export went to India, while imports from 
India constitute 77.7%.21  
 
The friendship is deeply rooted in religion, culture, history 
and economic ties, encompassing a wide range of areas and 
issues of common interests like security, politics, trade and 
economy. It proved that a small state with a stable 
government and right leadership could be an equal partner of 
a giant state with asymmetric economic, political, military, 
demographic and geographic powers. But will it ever remain 
the same? Some new developments in regional and 
international relations, and the process of globalization are 
testing the validity and relevance of both the treaty and the 
‘special’ relation.  
 
As old order changed, yielding place to the new after the 
British withdrawal from India, Bhutan felt the need to 
negotiate a new relation with India. The Treaty of Punakha 
1910 did not define Bhutan’s status, technically or legally 
since it was only designed to stop any Chinese threat to 
British India’s northern frontier. The British did not realize 
the necessity for Bhutan's external relation as long as the 
country remained isolated and inward-looking.  
                                              
21 Does this figure translate into economic vulnerability? Or putting 
all eggs into one basket?  
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The Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1949 
While negotiating a fresh treaty, both countries were clear in 
their objectives – Bhutan to get the new India’s recognition of 
its independence like the British and to get back 32 square 
kilometers Dewangiri (now Dewathang) ceded by the Treaty of 
Sinchula, 1865; and India to restore Dewathang, so as to 
remove any fear of India’s alleged imperialistic design, and 
prevent Bhutan from looking north.  
 
The Article 2 of the treaty reads, “The Government of India 
undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal 
administration of Bhutan. On its part the Government of 
Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government 
of India in regard to its external relations.” Does this treaty 
reduce Bhutan - one of Asia’s oldest and un-colonized nations 
into a mere Indian protectorate?  
 
There were discrepancies between English and Bhutanese 
(Dzongkha) texts of the treaty, and the treaty did not specify 
which version was authoritative. New Delhi insisted Bhutan 
was obligated to be guided by India’s advice while Bhutan 
maintained it will merely seek and consider India’s advice. 
Decades of disagreement led to New Delhi’s acceptance of 
Thimphu’s version and interpretation in mid-1980s.22 A new 
interpretation of the article came up in 1974 following the 
Bhutanese foreign minister’s comment that India's advice and 
guidance on foreign policy matters was optional. 
 
Agreement or disagreement over its interpretation is not 
important here; what is important is the true existing reality, 
for the treaty has never stood in way of Bhutan conducting its 
international affairs. The leaders of both countries believed 
that the continuity and sanctity of the 1949 treaty depends 
ultimately on the faith and trust which the signatories 
                                              
22 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the 
Twentieth Century, (2001, University of Washington Press, Seattle 
and London) p.176 
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reposed in each other. Almost half a century on, the treaty is 
vibrant and dynamic as both countries co-operate for 
common interest. Bhutan has always stood by India, for "a 
strong India means a strong friend of Bhutan." The Indo-
Bhutan friendship qualifies as a good example of bilateral 
relation in the region, not only because of the relations 
between the two countries and governments, but equally 
because of the individuals and organizations in both the 
countries, which have fostered closeness and 
interdependence on their own. 
 
Asked whether it is time to renew the treaty of 1949 given the 
excellent Indo-Bhutan relations and the global changes in 
international relations, Bhutan’s foreign minister Jigmi Y 
Thinley had said the treaty has never been a constraint in 
conducting Bhutan’s foreign relations, establishing diplomatic 
relations, engaging in various international forums, and in 
pursuing the paths with respect to its aspiration.23 In the 
words of former Indian Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit, the 
letters of the treaty do not really prevail in terms of 
determining the relations between Bhutan and India, but 
rather it is more of spirit of goodwill and understanding and 
friendship that prevails in conducting their separate relations 
with other countries. The relation demonstrates how the 
tremendous goodwill and friendships between the two 
countries can transcend legal instruments, and the words 
printed on paper. 
 
Integration of Tibet, PLA’s incursion into delimitated border, a 
vague Chinese claim and other events shattered Bhutan’s 
isolation policy since isolation was detrimental to sovereignty, 
and Tibet was a good example. The country was forced to re-
evaluate its traditional isolation policy, and the need to 
develop its lines of communications with India became an 
urgent necessity. It was in this respect that Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru visited Bhutan on a horseback in 
                                              
23 Transcription of talk given to the students of Sherubtse College, 
Kanglung, on 24 February 1999 
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September 1958 to convince Bhutan end its isolation policy 
and accept India’s economic assistance. India feared that any 
direct foreign contact would pull Bhutan into big power 
politics and might seriously affect its social and economic 
stability, which could in fact destabilize a strip of land 
connecting north-east to the rest of India. 
Bhutan: the Most Vulnerable Sector in the Indian Security System  
From India's perspective, Bhutan is one of the most 
vulnerable sectors in the Indian security system, as it "stood 
out as a wide vacuum on a frontier of vital strategic 
importance." Stability in entire Himalayan neighborhood 
became important for India's security. Thus, India 
unilaterally included Bhutan within India's northern security 
system. India inherited the British doctrine of preventing the 
areas within India's strategic interest from falling under the 
foreign powers, and India is always sensitive about keeping 
an exclusive influence in the southern Himalaya. For India, a 
weak Bhutan means weak buffer state or "extended frontier" 
with China, and it is only in this connection that India has 
played a major role in brining an end of Bhutan’s isolation 
policy, started socio-economic development and promoted 
Bhutan’s international stature through UN membership and 
other multilateral organizations. India’s assistance is 
indirectly tied to Bhutan’s refusal of China’s assistance. 
Problem in Southern Borders 
No country has threatened Bhutan’s territorial integrity 
militarily since the Duar War of 1864-65. Bhutan’s greatest 
threat came from its northern borders – be it suzerainty 
claims, cartographic invasion, territorial intrusion, enclaves 
occupation etc. While its limited security forces were guarding 
northern borders, all was quiet on its southern front because 
an excellent Indo-Bhutan friendship was thought to have 
guaranteed it. There was not a single security post along the 
southern border.  
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It turned out to be ironic that the major security threat in 
recent years came from its unguarded southern border. India 
may be a good friend and neighbour, but its northeast 
insurgents are not. These non-state actors from Assam and 
West Bengal who were fighting for independence from Indian 
Federation have the potential to undermine the friendship not 
only between two countries, but also between peoples of both 
countries living along the borders. The insurgents had been 
using Bhutanese soil as hideouts and training ground to 
carry out hit and run activities against vital infrastructure 
and security forces of India. The presence of these militants, 
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and National 
Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and Kamtapur 
Liberation Army (KLA) have been a great concern to Bhutan 
for nearly a decade until they were flushed out in December 
2003.  
 
India’s northeastern corner and the neighbouring countries 
embody some of the major demographic and environmental 
time bombs in the subcontinent.24 There are insurgent 
movements from about 50 groups rooted in history, language 
and ethnicity, tribal rivalry, migration, local resource control, 
drugs, centre and state government negligence and foreign 
powers involvement. Bhutan’s proximity to the region makes 
it very susceptible to any ethnic tensions in the northeast. 
The presence of militants in Bhutan was known only in 1996. 
Bhutan understood the potential danger, and beginning 1997 
the issue dominated the National Assembly discussions.  
 
Bhutan was caught up in a situation whereby it has a little or 
no human and materials to finance military operation, and 
acquiescing to India’s unilateral operation would have been a 
violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bhutan. 
Moreover, any military action would incite the local Assamese 
population against the Bhutanese population. Bhutan uses 
Indian highways to travel from west to east and vice versa, 
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putting Bhutanese travelers at risk, should there be any 
military action. The militants were adamant on staying on in 
the country until they get independence from India, thus 
justifying their long-term presence. 
 
For the first time in its modern history, Bhutan is considering 
creation of a large militia or reserve force to defend national 
borders, which was largely prompted by these non-state 
actors. The idea to train students completing universities or 
high schools for guarding the borders permanently have been 
directly prompted by security threat posed by militants. 
Located between two military giants, Bhutan has never 
militarized itself, and its standing army numbering a couple 
of thousands were used to guard the northern frontier. Today, 
the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA), Royal Body Guard (RBG), and 
Royal Bhutan Police (RBP) together employ 14,209 
personnel,25 and this increase was promoted by the recent 
crisis with the militants. The security of its southern border is 
being strengthened through regular patrolling and 
surveillance of high-risk areas. Now military camps have been 
established and troops deployed along the entire border areas 
between Sibsoo and Daifam (farthest eastern and western 
border towns).26  
Globalization 
It would be absurd to try to stop the wind of globalization 
sweeping the world, but if navigated skillfully, steering a 
steady course and avoid reef, can reach you to haven safe and 
sound.27 There is no denying the fact that technological 
progress of recent years has transformed our lives, especially 
in field of communications and access to knowledge. The 
drastic changes witnessed in the last few years have widened 
                                              
25 “Strengthening national security” at www.kuenselonline.com, July 
25, 2004 
26 “Need to strengthen Indo-Bhutan border security” at 
www.kuenselonline.com, July 25, 2004  
27 Amin Maalouf, In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to 
Belong; Barbara Bray (Trans.) (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2000) 
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the gap across many generations in many aspects of life. 
Bhutan is aware that globalization is irreversible and 
inevitable, that in the end the benefits will outweigh the cost, 
and that it is a necessity, not a choice.28 Amin Maalouf argues 
that the present mass media revolution –‘the multiplication of 
the means of expression and the diversification of opinion’ – is 
also leading to intellectual impoverishment since outpouring 
of ideas on global scale leads to conformism which is the 
‘lowest form of intellectual denominator’ – that is reading 
same book, listening to same music, watching same films, 
and swallowing same sound, images and beliefs. TV give 
access to an infinite variety of opinions, the powerful media 
mogul only amplify the prevailing opinions, rejecting others 
point of view, and a flood of words and images discourages 
criticism.  
Cultural Identity to Fight Cultural Homogenization 
As remote, cocooned and isolated Bhutan may be until recent 
years, the process of globalization is transforming structures 
of society, economy and polity. While there are many 
advantages of globalization, its negative impacts are not few. 
Wedged between two billion Chinese and Indians, Bhutan 
(population 700,000) has long pursued the preservation and 
promotion of its unique culture as its national identity. The 
country has neither military nor economic might, and its age-
old culture and tradition have been promoted to fight off the 
global cultural homogenization. Much time and resources 
have been committed to prevent its culture from going to 
museum. Globalization is changing the both mental and 
physical contours of Bhutan where 85% of the population are 
farmers. How can Bhutan overcome dark side of 
globalization? Until early 1960s Bhutan was a mediaeval 
country in strict western sense of the term, but the recent 
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changes are dramatically transforming its economics, politics, 
and society as never before. 
Beginning of an Aerial Invasion 
Bhutan became the last nation in the world to introduce 
television in 1999, and a few years later a crime waves of 
murder, homicide, shop-lifting, burglary, theft, fraud, drunk 
driving followed, together with students indiscipline, 
substance abuse, disrespect for values, mental problem. 
Marihuana growing wild along the road was once used as 
feeds for pigs, and now children are beginning to smoke it. 
These social ills are mostly attributed to TV.  
 
The onslaught of satellite TV and information technology is 
eroding the badge of national identity and sovereignty, which 
Bhutan has priced and prided upon. Cable TV may have 
opened people’s eyes to outside world, but it is blurring its 
inner eyes to see oneself. It is fast homogenizing the tradition 
to modernity, and adaptation is impossible given the speed, 
rapidity, volume and glamour of the TV culture. At no time in 
history is the country going through a rapid social and 
cultural transformation. At the end of the day, we will have a 
weakened social solidarity, diluted culture, weak family 
values, a sterile spiritual plane, and not god-fearing, but god-
fighting men and women. 
 
The logic for opening up to TV and Internet was an 
assumption that Bhutanese are educated enough to sieve the 
good from the worst, a belief that a culture as rich and 
vibrant as Bhutanese could prevail over trash TV culture, and 
the people are capable of selecting good from rubbish; but a 
few year experiences is proving the opposite. TV is striking at 
the heart of what Bhutan has been trying to promote and 
preserve as its national identity. “(T)his is a country that has 
reached modernity at such breakneck speed that the god of 
wisdom Jambayang is finding it virtually impossible to 
compete with the new icons,” and TV is “persuading a nation 
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of novice Buddhist consumers to become preoccupied with 
themselves, rather than searching for their self.”29  
WTO: Economic Entanglement or Enlightenment? 
Bhutan’s commitment to open itself to the globalization can 
be better understood from its application to World Trade 
Organization (WTO) membership. It is a signatory regional 
free trade regimes such as SAARC Free Trade Agreement 
(SAFTA), and Bay of Bengal Trade and Economic Cooperation 
(BB-TEC). Bhutan is not tempted to accept or reject 
globalization but chose to take a path at its own strength and 
speed. But membership follows liberalization, economic 
reforms, re-legislation, new institutions and harmonization of 
national laws, regulations and procedures to conform to the 
WTO agreements. Can Bhutan fulfill and afford these 
changes? Is Bhutan prepared to compete and benefit from 
enhanced market access? The dilemma here is Bhutan’s 
ability to reconcile incongruity between perceived benefits and 
its limited capacity to reap benefits in the ‘level playing 
field’.30 Bhutan faces lots of disadvantage from its poor 
natural resources, lack of labour, capital and technology, 
problems related to size, structural and geographic location.31 
Conclusion 
Sino-Bhutan relation has been growing since the beginning of 
the first annual border talk in 1984. From 1959 to the 
present day, China’s consistent goals has been to draw 
Bhutan away from its special relations with India, and it used 
various tools to this end - refusal to discuss about Bhutan 
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Guardian, Saturday, June 14, 2003 
30 Tashi Wangyal, ibid 
31 Land transportation in a landlocked countries whose products 
need to cross borders is costly. The median landlocked country pays 
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during Sino-Indian border talks, providing incentives to 
Bhutan for having a direct relation with Beijing and linking 
Sino-Bhutan relation as a condition for softening Sino-Indian 
rapprochement. China has still refuse to accept what it calls 
as ‘unequal’ Indo-Bhutan relation. While Chinese allegation 
that the 1949 treaty was an ‘unequal treaty’ symbolizing 
India’s expansionism and hegemony appeals to Bhutanese 
nationalism, China has negotiated in early 1980s to recognize 
Bhutan as an Indian protectorate in return for India’s ban on 
Tibetan refugees’ anti-China activities from Indian soil.32 
Among other factors, history still haunts Bhutan – series of 
claims China made on Bhutan – despite the interim 
agreement signed between the two countries recognizing each 
other’s independence. Is the interim agreement a ploy – a 
Chinese Trojan Horse - to deceive Bhutan into believing 
China’s good, neighbourly and benign intentions and to woe 
Bhutan, only to be a monster later?  
 
China has been pressing for establishing a diplomatic relation 
before signing final border agreement. If that is the rigid 
Chinese criterion, then it will not be solved at all until there is 
thaw in Sino-Bhutan relation. India has played a big role in 
Bhutan’s development. India’s assistance was tied to 
Bhutan’s support on India’s security need – meaning no third 
power presence in Bhutanese soil. India has showed a 
tremendous good will by enhancing Bhutan’s independence 
by supporting Bhutan’s United Nations membership, and 
acceptance of Thimphu’s interpretation of Article 2 of the 
1949 Treaty. 
 
Unlike Nepal and Sikkim (before merger), Bhutan has never 
played its China card against India. Bhutan saw what India 
could do to Nepal during 1988-89 embargo and integration of 
Sikkim to India in 1974, if it is provoked or if its neighbours 
are insensitive to its security concerns. Bhutan has always 
felt comfortable with the existing bilateral relation, and chose 
to be a pragmatic. India holds the same geographic trump 
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card it has with Nepal, and any disruption of communication 
through Indian territory will cripple the Bhutan’s economy. 
During the 1988 embargo on Nepal, Bhutan saw China’s 
inability to become India’s substitute. Bhutan’s economy is 
strongly depended upon India. Hydro-power project built 
through Indian grant is the main revenue earner, and the 
coming mega-hydro projects dependent on Indian energy 
market is going to the backbone of Bhutan’s economy. There 
is a great risk in any change in relation with India. 
 
Any improvement in Sino-India relation has been 
accompanied by diminished Chinese interests in Bhutan33 
and until such times when Sino-India relation has improved, 
there is no possibility for any resolution of border problem, 
nor diplomatic relation with China. So Sino-Bhutan border 
dispute will continue to be a serious security threat to 
Bhutan. 
 
The northeast insurgents have been flushed out now, but it is 
not a permanent solution as long as the problems continue in 
India. There is no adequate infrastructure and manpower to 
guard 266 kilometer Bhutan-Assam border. The 2003 
military actions against the militants have incensed the local 
population, and the Bhutanese travelers will continue to be a 
target of future retaliations. Bhutan has to be on guard as 
long as the insurgency problem is not solved in India, and the 
present situation depicts gloom pictures. India’s 
determination to crush any insurgency for independence, and 
the insurgents’ will to fight for independence are the two ends 
of spectrum.  
 
Socio-economic development plans are fast transforming 
Bhutan into a modern state. Various development indicators 
are above the regional average. But development has come at 
a cost – cost of environment despite 73% forest coverage, 
erosion of culture and tradition, dilution of people’s faith, 
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weakened communal and social solidarity and widening gap 
between the rich and poor. The opening of this Arcadian 
country to the forces of globalization, which comes in various 
sizes and forms, is increasing the country’s vulnerabilities in 
aspects of economy, society, environment, culture, religion 
and polity. All these changes have lots of bearing on the 
country’s security since the security paradigm has changed 
from its traditional (military) concept to include non-
traditional aspects. But this is not to suggest that Bhutan 
has to close its eyes to globalization. As Amin Maalouf argues, 
globalization, if navigated carefully, will reach the country to 
a safe shore of prosperity and security. 
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